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IS THERE AN END IN SIGHT IN THE CAPTAIN'S
SPYGLASS? THE QUEST FOR FINALITY*
JOHN

R. BROWN**

Whither, 0 splendid ship, thy white sails crowding,
Leaning across the bosom of the urgent West,
That fearest not sea rising, nor sky clouding,
Whither away, fair rover, and what thy quest?'

STARTING EACH DAY we are bombarded with chaos and
crisis. A few months ago it was the Falklands. More recently it is whether to freeze or unfreeze nuclear weapons.
And lurking in the background of this armament controversy
are questions of peace in the Middle East and the Far East,
the position of the Soviets and our handling of foreign affairs.
But of all these questions, and the many more that soon come
to mind, with the possible exception of concern over economic
affairs, the one problem which occupies every American's
mind is the question of crime. Americans today are not concerned about crime generally, nor crime as a fascinating sociological problem. Their concern has to do with crime here and
*This paper was presented at the Third Annual Alfred P. Murrah Lecture on the
Administration of Justice on November 11, 1982 at Southern Methodist University
School of Law. The lectureship was established at the School of Law through the
generosity of the Hatton W. Sumners Foundation to commemmorate the life and
work of Judge Alfred P. Murrah. The Journal of Air Law and Commerce has
published this lecture as a service to the School of Law.
**Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 1955 to the present;
Chief Judge, 1967 to 1979. A.B. Degree, University of Nebraska - 1930; J.D. Degree,
University of Michigan - 1932. Honorary Degrees: Doctor of Laws, University of
Michigan - 1959; University of Nebraska - 1965, Tulane University - 1979. Admitted
to the Bar, Texas, 1932. Partner: Royston and Rayzor, Attorneys - 1939-1955.
Robert Bridges, Shorter Poems bk. II [1879] No. 2 (A Passer-by) St.1.
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now, crime in their homes, crime in the streets and crime in
high places.
Because crime, criminals and criminal conduct are the grist
of the judicial mill, judges come face-to-face with the
problems of what the courts can or should do. In addressing
the problems of crime, my concern is not with the sociological
causes of crime, which is a problem for sociologists. Nor am I
concerned with the refinement of the principal purposes and
means for punishment, which is a problem for penologists. To
me the critical problem comes down to one simple word: finality, or more accurately, the lack of finality.
LACK OF FINALITY:

Delay is Ruining Us.' Delays have dangerous ends.4
Unlike so many aspects of the law, lack of finality is not one
that baffles the non-lawyer or calls for any elaborate definition. Lack of finality is something which all of us know,
whether on or off the bench, or as citizens, taxpayers, and
observers.
Before I begin the scenario on death cases, I want to make
clear that although the Supreme Court has to bear the ultimate responsibility for these frustrations and delays in death
cases, the Supreme Court is not to blame. The fact is that in
Furman v. Georgia,5 with each justice writing a concurring or
dissenting opinion to the sparce per curiam reversal, the
Some idea of the volume of criminal cases filed and to be disposed of is revealed
by the statistics showing the total number of cases commenced in the United States
district courts both in the nation as a whole and in the Fifth Circuit (and later in the
Eleventh), bearing in mind that federal district courts try only cases involving federal
crimes which are statutorily defined:
CRIMINAL CASES COMMENCED
YEAR
1980
1981
1982
A. Lincoln, 1862.

NATIONAL
39,115
42,437
44,787

4 W. SHAKESPEARE, HENRY

5 408 U.S. 238 (1972).

VI, Act III.

5TH CIRCUIT
9,951
11,394
5,309 (6,584 in 11th Cir).
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Court revolutionized the law of capital punishment.' By way
of Furman7 it was almost as though capital punishment was
being ordained for the first time. The Court was concerned
with the way capital punishment was being handled, particularly in the states.8 Imposition and execution of the death
penalty was seen by the Court as too capricious with little if
any rational basis for distinguishing between those to whom
death was imposed and those to whom a sentence of life or
less was imposed.' This concern with the effectuation of the
death penalty has led to a number of important and very serious cases. These cases include those pertaining to the selection and exclusion of jurors for conscientious scruples against
the death penalty, 10 the split trial on guilt/innocence and sentencing, the jury instructions essential to channeling a rational choice by the jury and many related problems.' Obviously with new and unexplored serious problems emerging in
dealing with this entirely new constitutional problem of imposing the death penalty, it takes time, patience and devotion
by these nine over-worked justices and this means some delay.
Even so, the result is bad for the American people.
To the annoyance of the non-lawyer public, the routine is
all too familiar. A sensational murder takes place. With effective police work, the perpetrator is found and charged. A trial
is held, conducted by a conscientious, intelligent judge, before
a jury honestly thought to have all of the qualifications required by the Constitution. The trial ends with the awesome
finality of the somber pronouncement of the death penalty by
the judge. This pronouncement is followed by the usual ap*Id.
SId.
* Id. at 248-57.
'

Id. at 249-51.
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 392 U.S. 510 (1968).

See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420
(1980); Stephens v. Zant, 631 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, Zant v. Stephens, 454 U.S. 814 (1981); Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410 (1982) (certifying a question of state law to the supreme court of Georgia); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, nn.3-4 (1982); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564 (1970); Street v. New York,
394 U.S. 576 (1969); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
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peal to the higher court, intermediate or final, in the jurisdiction concerned. The initial appeal is shortly followed by application for review by the United States Supreme Court,
claiming violation of a number of constitutional guarantees.
With the overwhelming burden of cases before the Supreme
Court, making it impossible in every death case for the Court
to then determine whether a constitutional error has been
made, the Supreme Court denies its discretionary review.
But the end is not yet in sight. Indeed, after two attempts
to have that "final" jury verdict reversed, we have not yet
even seen the open end of the tunnel. The convicted person
then returns to the court in which he was tried to present his
petition for writ of habeas corpus, 2 one of the most precious
rights that all citizens have and which we dare not jeopardize
out of some supposed dissatisfactions or frustrations flowing
from its use or abuse. Upon this petition, the case must then
wind its way again through the state appellate process, either
intermediate or final or both. The cautious lawyer for the accused naturally pursues every avenue open to him to once
again secure a ruling from the United States Supreme Court.
Occasionally the Supreme Court will take a case at this stage.
But more times than not, the Court will simply deny the permissive discretionary review and either expressly or impliedly
call for the exploration of the case in a United States district
court.
The case then comes back to the United States district
court located either in the district where the person was tried
or having jurisdiction over the place of his confinement. Thus
begins a virtual rehash of the complaints which have been
made on the initial appeal and in the state habeas proceedings. New restrictive rules's emerge, nearly all of which are
designed to require that the case must have been fully exhausted in the state tribunals as a condition for federal court
review. Commendable as these so-called technical rules are in
reducing opportunities for abuse of the Great Writ, each has
within itself further complications, including repeated
"
"

U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, c. 2 (known as the Great Writ).
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976).
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appeals.
During this review by a United States district court, the
case's handling may call for presentation of extensive testimony, bearing sometimes on the occurrence itself, but more
likely on the manner in which the case was tried. The review
often includes the performance of counsel, his adequacy, and
the circumstances which give rise to claims of constitutional
violations. After the hearing, the United States district judge
decides the case and either grants or denies the writ of habeas
corpus. The loser, either the petitioner or the state government, very likely will appeal to one of the twelve United
States courts of appeals.
Once appealed to a court of appeals, more and more delay is
inescapable. This delay includes obtaining the record, preparation of briefs, and the submission of the case either on
briefs or on oral argument before a panel of three judges followed by a written opinion of the court. Again, almost invariably, the loser will seek review by the Supreme Court of the
United States.
Overburdened as they are with 5,000 cases on the so-called
miscellaneous docket, it is backbreaking for the nine justices
of the United States Supreme Court to review these applications to determine whether further argument and review is
warranted. In the majority of cases, the Supreme Court will
deny the application for review. If the effect of the Supreme
Court's denial of review is to affirm the judgment of the court
of appeals in which the writ of habeas corpus was denied, one
would expect that within a reasonably short period of time,
the prisoner would be resentenced in the state court, a new
date of execution prescribed and shortly the execution would
take place.
But, alas, that infrequently occurs. The prisoner is returned
to death row and either through new counsel entering the case
or through his long-time counsel, a new theory is contrived.
Sometimes the new theory is based on intervening decisions of
the Supreme Court. In any event, the lawyer with the elastic
conscience demanded by the awesome finality of an execution,
commences a new, or continues the old habeas petition. Under
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the federal statutes which require the exhaustion of any new
contention in the state tribunals, this means the petitioner
must frequently start all over again in the state courts, go
through its various levels once again to the Supreme Court of
the United States and back again to the United States district
court. Once again the case becomes subject to review by a federal court, usually a single judge, to determine whether in the
light of the new claims, the state system has adequately protected the constitutional rights of the accused. The case is
then appealed to the court of appeals for its determination,
and further efforts are made in the Supreme Court of the
United States with the possibility of either a decision there or
a remand to the court of appeals or to a district court once
again to amplify the habeas.
At each of these stages, the sentencing authority - sometimes the governor, sometimes the presiding state judge has to refix the date and time of execution. As each of these
dates approach, the petitioner seeks a stay of execution. Considering the irretrievable finality of an execution, it is not unnatural that these are granted somewhat liberally. Also, again
quite naturally, counsel acting for a petitioner purposely
awaits until the very eleventh hour to seek a stay. Counsel
knows that the judge from whom the stay is sought will feel
under such tremendous pressure that, to assure a ventilation
of the claims, he will grant another stay. Once the stay is
granted, it means that the sentencing must take place all over
again, which, in turn triggers a repetition of the whole process.
Finality for a death penalty case does not come until execution. It should come as no surprise that this tedious process
which I have described has resulted in practically no executions. The annual rate of recorded executions in this country
has slowed from a high of 199 in 1935 to a mere handful each
year in the mid-1960s.14 As a practical matter, there was a
moratorium on executions from 1967 until 1977 when Gilmore
was executed in Utah. In 1979, two other prisoners, Spenkelink in Florida and Bishop in Nevada, were put to death. In
"' Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the
United States 1982-83 (103d ed. 1982).
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1981 Judy was executed in Indiana. This means there were no
executions in 1980 and one in 1981. On information from the
Bureau of Justice Statistics, there were 228 new death
sentences handed down in 1981.'" At the end of 1981, a total
of 838 persons were on death row nationwide.' 6 The conservative estimate is that there are now more than 1,000 persons
awaiting execution of the death sentence. Many of these persons have been on death row for more than a decade. That
statistic, in itself, poses serious questions of the eighth
amendment's constitutional guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment!
Although death cases provide the most spectacular example
of interminable delay after trial, conviction and affirmance,
delay is ever present in the hundreds of other non-capital but
violent crimes. These include robbery, rape, arson, kidnapping
and extortion. This accursed lack of finality deplored by all
reveals a contemporary cancer infecting the body politic, not
just the body of the law, corpus juris. The question, therefore,
arises: what causes the delay? Is it constitutional? Yes, in
part. Is it legislative in origin? Yes, to a great extent. Is it
judge-made? Do judges and courts have much responsibility?
Yes, to a great extent, as they conscientiously undertake to
interpret and apply constitutional requirements and legislative mechanisms. Each of these factors coalesces in the oversimplified but simple conclusion that it is the writ of habeas
corpus that brings this delay about.
Posing the question and giving an answer so simply, I must
assure the reader that I do not propose to repeal or obliterate
the "Great Writ," as it is called in England and the United
States.17 The Constitution recognized the writ in the suspension clause of article I, section 9.18 Section 14 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 authorized use of the writ by federal courts.1 9 The
"1 National Council on Crime and Delinquency, 13 Criminal Justice Newsletter No.
15, at .7(Aug. 2, 1982).

16Id.

17 See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURT 236, n.4 (3d ed. 1976)
[hereinafter HANDBOOK]; Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807).
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
2
" Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81 (1789).
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writ was greatly expanded in 1867 to empower federal courts
to grant the writ "in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution,
or of any treaty or law of the United States."2 0 As actually
applied for a long time, the writ would issue only if the court
that committed the prisoner lacked "jurisdiction" to do so.
This concept, never entirely rigid, underwent a great expansion with the celebrated decisions in Moore v. Dempsey in
1923,21 and Mooney v. Holohan in 1935,2 and culminated in
1942 in the sweeping declaration:
[t]he use of the writ in the federal courts to test the constitutional validity of a conviction for crime is not restricted to
those cases where the judgment of conviction is void for want
of jurisdiction of the trial court to render it. It extends also to
those exceptional cases where the conviction has been in disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and where the
writ is the only effective means of preserving his rights.23
The 1948 revision of the Judicial Code included for the first
time the statutory requirement that state remedies must first
be exhausted, 4 a major problem still haunting use of the writ.
In 1963, the Supreme Court dealt broadly and generously with
the necessity for a federal court hearing in Townsend v.
Sain." The Court listed six circumstances in which a hearing
would be required.2 Not entirely overlapping, the six circumstances listed in Townsend are closely related to the eight factors in the 1966 amendments to the Habeas Act, section
27
2254(d).
In the years since 1963, there has been a substantial expansion in the application and use of the writ with only an occa,0 Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 28 § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (1867).
261 U.S. 86 (1923).
22

294 U.S. 103 (1935).
Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05, (1942).
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2254, 62 Stat. 967 (1948).

"

372 U.S. 293 (1963).

Ild. at 313.
* Act of November 2, 1966, Pub. L. 89-711, 80 Stat 1105 (1966) (codifed at 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976)). As Professor Wright noted, "Townsend speaks of making a
hearing mandatory while the statute is in terms of circumstances dispelling the presumption of correctness . . ." HANDBOOK supra note 17 at 243, n.55.
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sional retrenchment. The two most notable are Stone v. Powell2s and Wainwright v. Sykes.29 Stone held that if the state
has provided an opportunity for a full and fair litigation of a
fourth amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted
federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional manner was introduced at his
trial. 30 Wainwright, dealing with the consequences of a failure
to comply with the state's contemporaneous objection rule,
held that habeas was not available unless cause was shown for
failure to comply with the local rule and prejudice.31
This massive expansion in use of the writ, with only slight
retrenchment, means that every conviction affirmed by the
state appellate courts may become the subject of a federal
habeas corpus petition. Each case's ultimate outcome is uncertain and there can be no finality until that federal proceeding has followed its torturous course. On the shoulders and
judicial conscience of hundreds of federal judges rests the burden of deciding the ultimate validity of a conviction which remains open to question. The validity of a jury's verdict remains up in the air even though the case has been affirmed by
the state's highest court. The case is subject to the possibility
of a federal court decision which, years after the event and
long after the disappearance or death of critical witnesses,
may send the case back to the state trial court. The sheer
figures, covering not only the entire United States " but those
" 428

U.S. 465 (1976).
" 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
" 428 U.S. at 494.
433 U.S. at 90-91.
"
Federal habeas corpus petitions attacking state convictions in all of the United

States district courts were:
YEAR
NUMBER
1960*
872
1970*
9,063
1980"*
7,031
1982**
8,059
*See Annual Report of the Director or Administrative Office of the United States,
Table C-2.** See Id. Table 20. For the Fifth Circuit (and now Eleventh) the number
of state Habeas Corpus petitions in the Distric Courts was as follows:

YEAR
1960

NUMBER
62

1970

1,801
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in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits closer to home," are staggering. They demonstrate to the most untutored, unlearned
lay person why spectacular cases of violent crimes are still
open and why they drag on and on.
For the purposes of this discussion, I draw from this brief
resume of the development of the writ of habeas corpus, its
undulating expansion, retraction, re-expansion and retrenchment one very significant impression. The celebrated quip, the
"Constitution is what the Justices say it is," is certainly true
as to habeas corpus. Even after Congress deliberately
amended the Act

4

to make federal habeas available to state

prisoners, little application of the writ was made for half a
century. Additionally, although judges considering federal
habeas in a specific case are necessarily confined to asserted
constitutional defects, the process leading to the issuance of
the writ of habeas corpus is not itself of a constitutional nature. 5 Thus, Congress has the legitimate and significant responsibility for declaring legislatively the manner, method
and means for enforcement of the writ. Congress has in fact
exercised its power with regard to the writ on a number of
occasions including in 1948 and 1966.
Congress has wide powers under article III, especially regarding the establishment and jurisdiction of lower federal
1980
1982

1,989
2,348 (1,148 5th Cir.; 1,200 11th
Cir.)

See Table.
" In the Fifth Circuit (and since division in October 1981, the Eleventh Circuit),
the numbers of state habeas and federal Section 2255 appeals have been:

YEAR
1960

NUMBER
27

1970

297

1975

470

1980
1981
1982

294
365
414 (241 5th Cir.,173 11th

Cir.)
Id. See Table.
- 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1977).

The process is subject, of course, to satisfaction of the Suspension Clause. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
"

19831

THE QUEST FOR FINALITY

courts.3 6 And of course, Congress possesses authority "to make
all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States.
.. "
Congress may, thus, constitutionally prescribe the time
or means in which rights can be asserted by a party before the
federal courts. As the Supreme Court in Yakus v. United
States8 stated: "No procedural principle is more familiar to
this Court than that a constitutional right may be forfeited in
criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely
assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to
determine it."' 9
Widespread dissatisfaction with lack of finality and the
40
other criticisms of the use of the writ of habeas corpus
among members of the Congress, the executive department
and courts have led to the introduction of a number of bills in
the Congress. The two categories I will deal briefly with are S.
2216,41 a bill to reform habeas corpus procedures, and those
relating to the Exclusionary Rule. 2
" See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 331 (1966) and several cases
cited therein.
3, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
- 321 U.S. 414 (1974).
" Id. at 444.
'0 See 21 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §

4261 at 588 (1978):
Commentators are critical of its present scope, federal judges are unhappy at the burden of thousands of mostly frivolous petitions, state
courts resent having their decisions re-examined by a single federal
district judge, and the Supreme Court in recent terms has shown a
strong inclination to limit its ability. Meanwhile, prisonersthrive on it
as a form of occupational therapy and for a few it serves as a means
to redressing constituional violations.
Id. (emphasis added).
" S. 2216, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 128 CONG. REc., S. 2172 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1982).
" Twelve bills have been introduced in the 97th Congress, six in the Senate and six
in the House. The Senate bills are: S. 2231, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 127 CONG. REc.,
S2416 (daily ed. May 18, 1981); S.2903, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 127 CONG. REc., S11449
(daily ed. Oct. 14, 1981); S. 1995, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 127 CONG. REc., S15672 (daily
ed. Dec. 12, 1981); S. 101, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. R-c., S135 (daily ed. Jan.
15, 1981); and S. 2304, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 127 CONG. REc., S3032 (daily ed. May 31,
1981). The House bills are: H.R. 4259, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H4897
(daily ed. July 24, 1981); H.R. 4422, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H6071
(daily ed. Sept. 9, 1981); H.R. 4606, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H6651
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Chief Justice Burger echoed concern with the state of finality in his December 1981 Year End Report on the Judiciary in
which he states that "the administration of justice in this
country is plagued and bogged down with lack of reasonable
finality of judgments in criminal cases," and urged congressional limitations "to claims of manifest miscarriages of justice." 43 Many years earlier Justice Harlan had sounded the
44
same concern in Mackey v. United States:

Both the individual criminal defendant and society have an interest in insuring that there will be at some point the certainty
that comes with the end of litigation .... No one, not criminal
defendants not the judicial system, not society as a whole is
benefited by a judgment providing that a man shall tentatively
go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter his
continued incarceration shall be subject to fresh litigation on
issues already resolved."
Attorney General Jim Smith of Florida pungently described
Florida as "one of two states out of which the book on abuses
of the writ of habeas corpus is being written. Texas is the
other."4 He pointed out the startling fact that Florida and
Texas "produced 35 percent of all petitions for the writ filed
in the United States in 1980 . . . and 46 percent of all the
evidentiary hearings held in such actions. ' 47 He summed up

his concern stating that "[a] flood has been unleashed that
must be curtailed if we expect to restore finality and public
48
confidence to our criminal justice system."

Justice Powell, concurring in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,"a
put his experienced judicial finger on both delay and what it
(daily ed. Sept. 28, 1981); H.R. 4898, 97th Cong., 2d Seas., 127 CONG. REC. H8119
(daily ed. Nov. 4, 1981); and H.R. 6049, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1981).
Reprinted in, 109 N.J.L.J. 1, col. 4 (Jan. 14, 1982). The Chief Justice's 1980
report is reprinted in 107 N.J.L.J., 1, col. 4 (Jan. 22, 1981).
401 U.S. 667, 690 (1971).
Id. at 690-91.
" The Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1982: Hearings before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, U.S. Senate, on S. 2216, 97th Cong., 2d Seas, 242 (April 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Habeas Corpus Hearings]
4

44
41

47

"

Id.

I8
Id.
412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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is doing to public respect for the judicial system and the integrity of state courts when he stated:
[T]he present scope of habeas corpus tends to undermine the
values inherent in our federal system of government. To the
extent that every state criminal judgment is to be subject indefinitely to broad and repetitive federal oversight, we render
the actions of state courts a serious disrespect in derogation of
the constitutional balance between the two systems.50
The Attorney General's Task Force Report on Violent
Crime made significant findings and recommendations for reform of habeas corpus:
Public confidence in the criminal justice system tends to be
eroded by a perception that the law allows a virtually endless
stream of attacks on the conviction, first, by direct appeal, and
second, by easy accessibility of the federal writ of habeas
corpus ....In the present state of criminal procedure in this
country, the formerly extraordinary remedy of collateral attack
on a criminal judgment and sentence has become not only ordinary but commonplace.5"
The function and purpose of the administration bill, S.
2216, was summarized by Jonathan C. Rose, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Policy. The bill is essentially an
amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the present habeas law. The
"bill would amend 28 U.S.C. § 2254 so as to require deference
to the result of a full and fair adjudication of a claim in state
proceedings. '5 2 To be full and fair the state adjudication
"must reflect a reasonable determination of the facts based on
the evidence presented to State courts, a reasonable Federal
law, and a reasonable application of the law to the facts."53
Appropriate allowances would be made for readjudication in
cases of subsequent discovery of new evidence and subsequent
retroactive changes in the law as announced by the Supreme
Court and declared by it to be retroactive."4 Next, a time limio Id. at 263.
" Attorney General's Task Force Report on Violent Crime 58 (August 17, 1981).
Habeas Corpus Hearings, supra note 46, at 16.
' Id.
(emphasis added).
4 Id.
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tation is imposed on access to the writ of federal habeas
corpus.55 The limitation would be done by an amendment to
28 U.S.C. § 2244. 5 ' The one year limitation period is to begin
running from the time state remedies are exhausted.57
A habeas court is also given the right to consider
unexhausted claims. 58 In addition, S. 2216 provides that certification of probable cause would have to be granted by the
Court of Appeals (or a judge thereof) not by the district court
as is now the case. And finally, the proposed bill codifies and
extends the rule of Wainwright v.Sykes."
68 Id.
8e Id.
57

Id.

" Announced almost at the same time as the April 1 hearings were being conducted, there is no indication of any view on Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
" See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). The administration, by supplemental memorandum, substantially accepted a statutory definition of "full and fair adjudication" by adding a new sub-section (h) to § 5 of the bill, which reads as follows:
4. The definition of a "full and fair adjudication" appearing in the
Administration's initial submission to Congress at pages 36-41 should
be codified and put in the text of the bill.
This is a sensible suggestion. It would avoid problems of the effectiveness of a definition appearing in legislative history, which were
noted by a number of speakers at the hearings. We should accordingly
have no objection to adding the following at the end of section 5 of S.
2216 [footnote omitted]:
(d) by adding a new subsection (h) reading as follows:
"(h) An adjudication of a claim in state proceedings is full
and fair in the sense of subsection (d) of this section unless"(1) the adjudication did not involve a decision of the claim
on the merits;
"(2)the adjudication involved an unreasonable interpretation
of federal law, and unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented, or an unreasonable disposition
resulting from the application of the law to the facts;
"(3)the adjudication was conducted in a manner inconsistent
with the procedural requirements of federal law that are applicable to state proceedings;
"(4)new evidence is produced which could not have been produced at the time of the adjudication through the exercise of
reasonable diligence, where a reasonable doubt is established
that the disposition of the claim would have been the same had
such evidence been produced in the state proceedings; or
"(5)a retroactively applicable change in federal law which is
binding on the courts of the state has occurred subsequent to
the adjudication, where a reasonable doubt is established that
the disposition of the claim would have been the same had the

1983]

THE QUEST FOR FINALITY

Of course, in addition to the testimonial support for the bill,
there was strong and vigorous opposition. The opposition first
asserted that there was no real need for the bill because the
courts were not "clogged" as claimed. This argument goes to
the burden on the courts, not to the problem of public dissatisfaction or lack of confidence in the judicial system because
of this frustrating lack of finality. And, in any event, judges on
the firing line will resolutely refute these assertions. There
was strong opposition to the definition of "fully and fairly adjudicated" with the general assumption that this is a matter
which should be left to the Supreme Court. Likewise, the opponents thought it best to leave to the Supreme Court a case
by case application of Wainwright v. Sykes. 0 Severe criticism
was also made of the one year limitation provision, the opponents' belief being that the present habeas Rule 9(b) is
adequate.
The exclusionary rule legislative proposals are, and are
thought to be, closely related to the general problem of
habeas. This is so because evidence obtained in violation of
the fourth amendment is frequently of a decisive nature which
either calls for granting of the writ, or often, the practical legal inability to prosecute the case, even though such excluded
evidence does not go to the truth finding process.
Although the Supreme Court, in United States v. Ross,"
overruled Robbins v. California2 after only one year,63 the administration was concerned that the cases reflected an unrealistic attitude that the exclusionary rule would motivate even
conscientious law enforcement officials to flawlessly apply law
which the courts still debated. The significance of this concern
is reflected in the fact that in the current Supreme Court term
changed law been applied in the state proceedings.

"The same definition shall apply to the term 'full and fair' in subsection (e) of this section, insofar as it is applicable to the determina-

tion of factual issues."
Habeas Corpus Hearings, supra note 46, at 33-34.

6 See supra note 42.
456 U.S. 798 (1982).
"453 U.S. 420 (1981).
13 456 U.S. at 826.
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that started in October of 1982, 8 of 23 criminal cases in
which petitions for certiorari have been granted involve the
fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule."'
Without exception, since 1956 the Court has stated emphatically that deterrence is the only rationale for the exclusionary
rule. In Stone v. Powell" the Court described the exclusionary
rule as "a judicially created means of effectuating the rights
secured by the Fourth Amendment"" and the Court added
"post-Mapp decisions have established that the rule is not a
7
personal constitutional right".
The exclusionary rule bills fall into three basic categories.
The first category, the good faith bills, is best represented by
Senator Thurmond's Bill, S. 2231.68 The bill states that any
search or seizure evidence shall be admissible in a federal
court "if the search or seizure was undertaken in a reasonable,
good faith belief that it was in conformity with the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United. States." 9 The
purpose of S. 2231 is to eliminate the application of the exclusionary rule where the deterrent purpose is not served because
the evidence was obtained either pursuant to a search warrant
or a seizure undertaken by officers in the reasonable and good
faith belief that their actions were lawful. This proposal is
very similar to the one adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Part II
of United States v. Williams. 0 In Williams the Fifth Circuit
declared:
Henceforth in this circuit, when evidence is sought to be excluded because of police conduct leading to its discovery, it will
be open to the proponent of the evidence to urge that the conduct in question, if mistaken or unauthorized, was yet taken in
" Constitutional Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, September 23, 1982
published speech).
" 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
Id. at 482.
6 Id. at 486.
" Other bills adopting variations of the good faith exceptions are H.R. 4606,
Cong., 2d Sess., 127 CONG. Rac. H6651 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1981); H.R. 4898,
Cong., 2d Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H8119 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1981); and S. 2304,
Cong., 2d Sess., 127 CONG. REc., S3032 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 1981).
" Id.
"0622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980)(en banc).

(un-

97th
97th
97th
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a reasonable, good-faith belief that it was proper. If the court
so finds, it shall not apply the exclusionary rule to the
7
evidence.
The second category, the "substantiality test" bills, are best
represented by S. 10172 which prohibits the exclusion of evidence "solely because that evidence was obtained in violation
of the fourth amendment unless the court finds as a matter of
law" an intentional or substantial violation of the Constitution.7 8 S. 101 traces its roots to the American Law Institute
Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure of 1975.
4
The final category of bills is best characterized by S. 7517
which totally eliminates the exclusionary rule and provides
that evidence "shall not be excluded on the grounds that such
evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment."1 7 This bill also contains provisions allowing actions for
actual and punitive damages by the victim against the offending officers.7 All of the exclusionary rule discussion has been
the subject of Judge Wilkey's extensive writings."
FINALIZING FINALITY
Having described in detail the nature of the problem and its
consequences and some of the congressional efforts to deal
with it, the question remains: What should be done? The answer for me is relatively simple: I can expound, as indeed I
have, and intimate at least some tentative conclusions, which
I am sure I have, but these do not decide the questions. This
1 Id. at 846-47.
72 S. 101, 97th Cong., 1st Seas., 127 CONG. REc. S135 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1981)
73 Id.
71 H.R.

4259 differs from S. 751 only in scope. H.R. 4259 would eliminate the exclusionary rule in all federal criminal proceedings while S. 751 is limited to Fourth
Amendment cases. S. 751, 97th Cong., 2d Seas., 127 CONG. REc. S2377 (daily ed. Mar.
19, 1981); H.R. 4259, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H4897 (daily ed. July 24,
1981).
76 S.751, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. S2401 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1981).
76 Id.

77Enforcing the Fourth Amendment by Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule:
Hearings Before The Sub-Comm. on Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 421 (1982) (Judge Malcolm Richard Wilkeys) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Exclusionary Rule].
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is the rule placed on me as a United States Circuit Judge.
Also, fretting, as most of us occasionally do, over some recent
pronouncement of a new principle or an extension of an old
principle, I must under my oath, faithfully carry out every decision of my superiors, the United States Supreme Court.
Nonetheless, circumscribed as I am by these constraints which
go with the office, I still have over a quarter of a century's
experience as a judge and hope that somehow it has given me
some wisdom which, within the first amendment, if not article
III, I can freely express.
Several of my beliefs are significant. The first is that I believe firmly that this whole problem is one calling for early,
earnest, deliberate consideration and action by the Congress.
Fortunately, there seems to be a recognition by large numbers
of congressmen that it is time for them to speak and act.
Without a doubt, I think it clear that Congress has the power
to act. Indeed, the 1867 amendments created our 1982
problems. Congress regularly, without opposition, and with no
subsequent judicial question, prescribes not only the underlying substantive right, but the time and manner of the enforcement of the right. What Congress may not do is to lay down
standards which in application offend some constitutional
right or guarantee. In 1948 and especially in 1966, Congress
undertook to do this in the very problem of federal habeas
review of state convictions.
While indeed it was long in coming, one need not speculate
on the decisive consequences of the 1966 congressional action.
In Sumner v. Mata,78 the Supreme Court decisively gave effect to the presumption of correctness of the State court's
findings. " The court dealt primarily with section 2254(d). The
correctness of the decision of the Ninth Circuit was tested entirely in the light of the statute, not by underlying and overpowering constitutional principles.8 0 Concluding that section
2254(d) applies to factual determinations made by state
courts, whether trial or appellate, the Supreme Court stated:
" 449 U.S. 539 (1981).
79

Id. at 552.

80 Id. at 543-44.
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"[t]his interest in federalism recognized by Congress in enacting section 2254(d) requires deference by federal courts to factual determinations of all state courts." " The Court continued by reasoning that "the Court of Appeals reached a
conclusion which was in conflict with the conclusion reached
by every other state and federal judge after reviewing the exact same record. Reading the court's opinion in conjunction
with section 2254(d), it is clear that the court could not have
even implicitly relied on paragraph 1 through 7 of section
82
2254(d) in reaching its decision.1
The Court made clear that in the 1966 amendments C'ongress specified that, in the absence of enumerated exceptions,
the burden would rest upon the petitioner to establish by convincing evidence that the state court factual determination
was erroneous." The Court recognized that Congress, not the
Court, meant to insure that a state finding would not be overturned in such a situation and that "in order to insure that
this mandate of Congress is enforced" ' the Court prescribed
specific but rather unusual conditions for district court fact
findings under section 2254(d). 5
I am equally convinced that there is no basis for the objection asserted by some that Congress should not act for fear
that in acting it might do more harm than good. Using the
broad, general language typical of the 1966 amendments and
now included as proposed amendments in S. 221686, a case
might arise in which the constitutional claim is not within the
statute but which for exceptional reasons should be recognized. If that should occur, there is no doubt that the federal
courts and the Supreme Court will have the power to determine that within such a case application of the detailed restrictions of S. 2216 are unconstitutional. The needed reform
statute should not be condemned as a whole simply because,
in a particularized situation, it could not be squared with the
Id. at 547.
Id. at 548-49.
, Id. at 551.
"

84
'

Id.

Id. at 539.
S. 2216, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S2172 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1982).
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constitution. Ample basis would exist for severability.
Legislation is also needed and quite appropriate to further
define terms including those used by the United States Supreme Court. Thus, in Wainwright v.Sykes, 7 the Court, declining to define "cause" and "prejudice," held in effect that
one having failed to comply with a state contemporaneous objection rule had no right to federal habeas relief unless he
showed cause and prejudice. 8 In the few years intervening,
these two relatively simple terms have given rise to scores of
cases, some of which reach surprising results. The effect of
many of these cases is to do away with, in actuality, the principle of Wainright v. Sykes.8'9
The proposed statute"' requires that there be "actual
prejudice" and that the failure to raise the claim properly,
was "the result of state action in violation of the constitution.
. ."
*
State action is assumed to embrace ineffectiveness of
counsel under the Sixth Amendment. 2 Broad as the words
are, we nevertheless will still give some latitude to federal district courts, leaving initially for their interpretation the congressional Act.
Although the time period of the statute of limitations provision is obviously a policy question for Congress, it is certainly
within my judicial province to urge that some limitation, specific in nature, is needed. Although the continued incarceration of a person 20 years after an affirmed conviction, because
of a constitutional error announced in the 19th year and previously both unknown and unpredictable, causes some uneasiness, one must again regard the public good which calls mini87

433 U.S. 72 (1977).
IId. at 90-91.

See Goodman, and Sallett, Wainwright v. Sykes: The Lower Federal Courts Respond. 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1683 (1979). This involves questions of whether the "deliberate bypass" of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) still has application and whether
"cause" blends into "prejudice" and vice versa. Much turns on the effectiveness of
counsel and whether action or inaction of counsel even satisfying the standards of the
Sixth Amendment can constitute "cause." See, e.g. McDonald v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 667
(5th Cir. 1976).
" S. 2216, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. S2172 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1982).
"

91 Id.
9'

Hearings on Exclusionary Rule, supra note 77.
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mally for confidence by the people in the system of criminal
justice. More often than not in such situations the reversal by
habeas corpus does not either spell or intend the dismissal of
the charges. But in fact it may amount to that because of the
passage of time, the dimming of memory of witnesses, their
disappearance, or often death. There are differences in the various bills, some providing that the limitation period begin
when all state remedies are exhausted, others after the final
judgment of the state court. The likely beginning time will be
the date when all state remedies are exhausted, certainly now
a well-known event.
With respect to the exclusionary rule, I am not under the
same sort of wraps. After all, the Fifth Circuit has spoken in
part II of Williams.9 3 Our court now believes in and follows
the good faith exception. 4 But, however contrived or statutorily phrased, faithful adherence to the declarations of the Supreme Court permits the operation of the exclusionary rule
only in those cases in which deterrence of the officer is a factor. Wherever and whenever deterrence is not a factor the loss
of highly probative, sometimes decisive, evidence is too high a
price to pay for the actions of the officer even though years
later they are held to be unconstitutional. Congress should
take the Court at its word, recognizing that the exclusionary
rule is not of constitutional origin or stature and is subject to
legislative adjustment just as all other federal rules of evidence are."
Is there an end in sight in the captain's spyglass? Well, the
end may not be in sight but clearly visible is the dome of the
United States capital ard the likelihood that the Congress,
within the confines of the Constitution, will bring its judgment, wisdom and experience to bear on this awful problem of
a lack of finality and spare the public the anguish of waiting
forever and ever for the final day of judgment.
622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980).
"Id.
" With Pub. L. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9, Mar. 30, 1973 Congress asserted its right to review and amend the Federal Rules of Evidence. The law deferred the effectiveness of
the Rules until their express approval by Congress. After amending some of the Rules
significantly, Congress approved them in Pub. L. 93-595, Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1939.
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The quest for finality, for scholars, for lawyers, for judges
and for all is worth the struggle.
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